By Stephen Brown<\/p>\n
Across the Global South, the COVID-19 pandemic has reversed years of socioeconomic
\nprogress, disproportionally harming poor people. Low- and lower-middle-income countries
\nin particular are struggling more than ever to find the resources to support their citizens\u2019
\nhealth and wellbeing at this time of crisis. Moreover, disruptions to trade, investment and
\nremittances have caused a drop in international sources of development finance.
\nForeign aid is therefore more important than ever. A growing number of studies has
\ndocumented how aid has responded to the new dynamics at the local and national level. But
\nwhat impact has the COVID pandemic had on foreign aid globally?
\nNew trends<\/p>\n
One of the first new trends to emerge after the COVID pandemic hit has been the increased
\nfocus on the health sector and on social assistance. Foreign aid clearly plays a key role in
\nproviding COVID-related medical care and supplies, including treatments and vaccines.
\nSocial assistance has also proved crucial for mitigating the secondary effects of the
\npandemic and preventative measures such as lockdowns, which have pushed 100 million
\npeople into extreme poverty.<\/p>\n
For the past decade or more, foreign aid had been placing increasing emphasis on long-term
\ngrowth as a means of poverty reduction, including through spending on large-scale
\ninfrastructure projects. With the pandemic, the pendulum has swung back towards meeting
\nmore immediate health and material needs.
\nHowever, without an increase in overall aid budgets, the reallocation of resources to social
\nspending could hobble important work in other sectors. Moreover, if funds already
\nearmarked for other health-related areas are redirected to fighting COVID, a range of
\nimportant activities would have to be sacrificed, from maternal and child health to HIV\/AIDS
\nPage 2 of 4<\/p>\n
prevention and treatment, thereby increasing the burden of other diseases.
\nReinforced trends
\nMost other COVID-related foreign aid trends are not new, but rather an acceleration of preexisting ones. For instance, according to OECD data, the proportion of aid committed to the
\nhumanitarian sector had already been growing, from about 5% of official development
\nassistance in the early 2000s to an average of 13% in 2016\u20132018. The COVID crisis has
\nfurther boosted spending on emergency assistance.
\nA loss of revenue, paired with the need to increase expenditures, has caused large
\ngovernment budget deficits around the world. Although most countries in the Global North
\ncan manage additional borrowing, the COVID crisis has pushed debt in many developing
\ncountries, already a growing problem over the past decade, to a crisis level. Debt relief is
\nback on the agenda, but with little action to date. G20 countries have postponed the
\nservicing of debt, but have not cancelled any. More significant measures will have to follow
\nin 2021 and beyond.<\/p>\n
An additional reinforced trend is the growing emphasis on global public goods. Increasingly,
\ndonor countries are not just seeing their role as \u201chelping\u201d developing countries, but
\ndedicating considerable funds to addressing problems that affect people around the world,
\nsuch as global warming. COVID-19 is a perfect example of a new problem that requires a
\nglobal response. To a certain extent, aid donors have recognised this, for example by
\nfunding COVAX, a facility that will distribute vaccines to all countries who request it,
\nregardless of ability to pay.<\/p>\n
However, donor countries have displayed a very high degree of \u201cvaccine nationalism\u201d,
\nlocking up the vast majority of supplies and prioritising the vaccination of their entire
\npopulations before releasing surpluses to protect even the most vulnerable populations in
\nthe Global South. According to The Economist, most Africans won\u2019t be vaccinated for
\nanother two or even three years.<\/p>\n
Relatedly, the pandemic has subverted North-South hierarchies. The United States and
\nEuropean countries have proved the least able to prevent COVID transmission at home.
\nMuch pandemic assistance, from protective equipment to medical assistance and vaccines,
\nhas flowed not from the Global North to the Global South, but from Southern countries such
\nas China, India and Cuba to other countries in the South and, in some cases, in the North.
\nThe interruption of international travel has also increasingly forced Northern aid actors,
\nboth in government and NGOs, to rely on local staff not only for project implementation but
\nPage 3 of 4
\nalso program design, management and monitoring. Development actors from the Global
\nSouth and their allies in the North had increasingly been advocating the \u201clocalisation\u201d of
\nforeign aid. COVID dramatically accelerated the process.<\/p>\n
Finally, the COVID crisis has reinforced the decade-long donor trend of increasingly framing
\ntheir foreign aid as being in their own interest. Donors often repeat the mantra that \u201cno one
\nis safe until everyone is safe\u201d. Although presumably effective in rallying support in donor
\ncountries for the global fight against COVID-19, the increased place of self-interest as a
\njustification for aid \u2013 at the expense of altruism, global solidarity or concerns for justice \u2013
\nleaves room for aid cuts once the COVID crisis is over or in areas where donor interests are
\nless directly at play, such as gender equality in the Global South.
\nThe post-COVID aid landscape<\/p>\n
The fate of foreign aid in the coming years depends above all on donor government\u2019s
\npolitical will. Many of the trends outlined above could be considered positive. If they are to
\nendure and progress further in the post-COVID aid landscape, donors will need to recognise
\ntheir value. Moreover, as outlined above, some COVID-related trends have created new
\nrisks to the global development agenda, including the cannibalisation of existing aid-funded
\nprograms.<\/p>\n
These negative effects can only be mitigated by additional aid spending. Some donors,
\nnotably the United Kingdom, have enacted radical cuts to their aid programs. Others, such
\nas Germany, have responded by increasing aid budgets. Once the COVID crisis is over,
\ndonor countries will be under tremendous domestic pressure to rein in spending, and
\nofficial development assistance will be a tempting target. Thus, although COVID-19 has
\nreinforced foreign aid\u2019s role on the international stage, its medium-term effects might
\nundermine it, at least for traditional donors<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n
This blog summarises analysis that the author initially presented in a journal article
\navailable here.<\/p>\n
<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"
By Stephen Brown Across the Global South, the COVID-19 pandemic has reversed years of socioeconomic progress, disproportionally harming poor people. Low- and lower-middle-income countries in particular are struggling more than ever to find the resources to support their citizens\u2019 health and wellbeing at this time of crisis. Moreover, disruptions to trade, investment and remittances have<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":8,"featured_media":25249,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"_jetpack_newsletter_access":"","_jetpack_dont_email_post_to_subs":false,"_jetpack_newsletter_tier_id":0,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paywalled_content":false,"_jetpack_memberships_contains_paid_content":false,"footnotes":"","jetpack_post_was_ever_published":false},"categories":[244],"tags":[],"class_list":["post-28782","post","type-post","status-publish","format-standard","has-post-thumbnail","category-covid-19-update"],"yoast_head":"\n